STATUTE, a law made by the "sovereign power" in the state (see Act of Parliament). It forms a part of the lex scripta, or written law, which by English legal authorities is used solely for statutory law, a sense much narrower than it bore in Roman law. To make a statute the concurrence of the Crown and the three estates of the realm is necessary. Thus a so-called statute of 5 Ric. II. c. 5, directed against the Lollards, was afterwards repudiated by the Commons as passed without their assent. The validity of a statute was indeed at times claimed for ordinances such as that just mentioned, not framed in accordance with constitutional rule, and was actually given to royal proclamations by 31 Hen. VIII. c. 8 (1539). But this act was repealed by Edw. VI. c. 12, and since that time nothing but a statute has possessed the force of a statute, unless indeed certain rules or orders depending ultimately for their sanction upon a statute may be said to have such force. Examples of what may be called indirect legislation of this kind are orders in council (see Privy Council), by-laws made under the powers of the Public Health Acts, Municipal Corporation Acts and other Acts, and rules of court such as those made under the powers of the Judicature Acts and Acts of Sederunt of the Court of Session.

The list of English statutes as at present existing begins with the Statute of Merton, 1235.^[1] Many of the earlier statutes are known by the names of the places at which they were passed, e.g. the Statutes of Merton, Marlbridge, Gloucester, Westminster, or by their initial words, e.g. Quia Emptores, Circumspecte Agatis. The earliest existing statute roll is 6 Edw. I. (the Statute of Gloucester). After 4 Hen. VII. the statute roll ceased to be made up, and enrolments in chancery (first made in 1485) take its place. Some of the acts prior to the Statute of Gloucester are of questionable authority, but have gained recognition by a kind of prescription.

All statutes were originally public, irrespective of their subjectmatter. The division into public and private dates from the reign of Richard III. At present statutes are of four kinds, public general acts, public local and personal acts, private acts printed by the king's printers and private acts not so printed. The division into public general and public local and personal rests upon a resolution of both Houses of Parliament in 1798. In 1815 a resolution was passed in accordance with which private acts are printed, with the exception of name, estate, naturalization and divorce acts. The last two are now practically superseded by the provisions of the Divorce Act 1857 (except as to Ireland and India), and the Naturalization Act 1870. Since 1815 it has been usual to refer to public general acts by Arabic numerals, e.g. 3 Edw. VII. c. 21, public local and personal acts by small Roman numerals, e.g. 3 Edw. VII. c. xxi. Each act is strictly but a chapter of the legislation of the session, which is regarded as composing a single act divided into chapters for convenience, the chapters themselves being also called acts. The citation of previous acts is provided for by 13 and 14 Vict. c. 21, § 3. It is now usual for each chapter or act to contain a short title by which it may be cited, e.g. the Elementary Education Act 1870. The Short Titles Act 1892 created short titles for numerous single acts and groups of acts, and since then it has been usual to cite acts and groups by their short titles - where possible rather than by the year of the reign. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 113, s. 3, makes evidence the king's printers' copies of private and local and personal acts. A private act not printed by the king's printers is proved by an examined copy of the parliament roll.

A public act binds all subjects of the realm, and need not be pleaded (except where the law from motives of policy specially provides for pleading certain acts, as in the defences of not guilty by statute, the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of Limitations). A private act must generally be pleaded, and does not as a rule bind strangers to its provisions. Formerly an act took effect from the first day of the session in which it was passed. The hardship caused by this technical rule has been obviated by 33 Geo. III. c. 13, by which an act takes effect from the day on which it receives the royal assent, where no other date is named. This has been held to mean the beginning of the day, so as to govern all matters occurring on that day. An act cannot in the strict theory of English law become obsolete by disuse. Nothing short of repeal can limit its operation. The law has, however, been interpreted in many cases with somewhat less rigour. In the case of a prosecution for blasphemy in 1883 (R. v. Ramsay) Lord Coleridge said, "though the principles of law remain unchanged, yet (and it is one of the advantages of the common law) their application is to be changed with the changing circumstances of the times."^[2] This would be applicable as much to the interpretation of statutes as to other parts of the common law. The title, preamble and marginal notes are strictly no part of a statute, though they may at times aid its interpretation.

Besides the fourfold division above mentioned, statutes are often classed according to their subject-matter, as perpetual and temporary, penal and beneficial, imperative and directory, enabling and disabling. Temporary acts are those which expire at a date fixed in the act itself. Thus the Army Act is passed annually and continues for a year; the Ballot Act 1872 expired at the end of 1880, and the Regulation of Railways Act 1873 at the end of five years. By means of these temporary acts experimental legislation is rendered possible in many cases where the success of a new departure in legislation is doubtful. In every session an Expiring Laws Continuance Act is passed for the purpose of continuing (generally for a year) a considerable number of these temporary acts. By 48 Geo. III. c. 106 a continuing act is to take effect from the date of the expiration of a temporary act, where a bill for continuing the temporary act is in parliament, even though it be not actually passed before the date of the expiration. Penal acts are those which impose a new disability; beneficial, those which confer a new favour. An imperative statute (often negative or prohibitory in its terms) makes a certain act or omission absolutely necessary, and subjects a contravention of its provisions to a penalty. A directory statute (generally affirmative in its terms) recommends a certain act or omission, but imposes no penalty on nonobservance of its provisions. To determine whether an act is imperative or directory the act itself must be looked at, and many nice questions have arisen on the application of the rule of law to a particular case. Enabling statutes are those which enlarge the common law, while disabling statutes restrict it. This division is to some extent coincident with that into beneficial and penal. Declaratory statutes, or those simply in affirmance of the common law, were at one period not uncommon, but they are now practically unknown. The Treason Act 1351 is an example of such a statute. Statutes are sometimes passed in order to overrule specific decisions of the courts. Examples are the Factors Act 1877, the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878, the Married Women's Property Act 1893, the Trade Disputes Act 1906.

By the constitutions of many states English statute law, as it existed at the time of the separation from England, and as far as it is applicable, has been adopted as part of the law of the states. The United States and the state are not bound by an act of Congress or a state law unless specially named. The states legislate for themselves within the limits of their own constitution and that of the United States. Here appears the striking difference between the binding force of a statute of the United Kingdom and an act passed by Congress or a state legislature. In the United Kingdom parliament is supreme; in the United States an act is only of authority if it is in accordance with the constitution. The courts may declare an act void if it contravene the constitution of the United States or of a state, so that practically the Supreme Court of the United States is the ultimate legislative authority. The restrictions upon Federal legislation in the constitution of the United States provide against the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus except in case of rebellion or invasion, the passing of a bill of attainder or ex post facto law, the imposition of capitation or other direct tax, unless in proportion to the several states, or of a tax or duty on exports, the preference of the ports of one state over those of another, the drawing of money from the treasury except by appropriations made by law, and the grant of a title of nobility. Constitutional amendments contain further limitations, e.g. the taking of private property for public use without just compensation, and the abridging of the right of citizens on account of race, colour or previous condition of servitude. State legislation is limited by s. 10: "No state shall. .. make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility." The section further forbids. imposition of duties on imports or exports or any duty of tonnage without consent of Congress. State constitutions often contain further restrictions; among the more usual are provisions against laws with a retrospective operation, or impairing the obligation of contracts, or dealing with more than one subject to be expressed in the title. The time when a statute is to take effect after its passing is often fixed by state constitutions. The statutes of the United States were revised under the powers of an act of Congress passed in 1874 (sess. i. c. 333), and the volume of Revised Statutes was issued in 1875. There was a second edition in 1878 and several supplements have appeared since that date. Many of the states have also issued revised editions of their statutes. The rules of construction are in general agreement with those adopted in England. In some states the referendum has been introduced in certain cases.